

**Political History Collection
Interview H.0007.06 : Tape 6**

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Location of Interview: Majnu Tila, New Delhi, India
Date of Interview: April 16, 1995
Language of Interview: Tibetan
Interviewed by: Melvyn Goldstein and Paljor Tsarong
Name: (Litang) Athar, Ngawang Norbu [Tib. (li thang) a thar ngag dbang nor bu]
Gender: Male
Age: 64
Date of Birth: 1931

Abstract

Ngawang Norbu [Tib. ngag dbang nor bu], also known as Litang Athar [Tib. li thang a thar], was a monk and trader in Bö. He was part of the first group of six Khambas taken from Kalimpong to Saipan in 1957 by the CIA for training. He was parachuted into Central Tibet in October 1957 to make contact for the Americans with Phala and the Dalai Lama. In this interview, he discusses preparations for war such as training and arms drops as well as the instructions from the United States to wait two years before launching a total rebellion.

Tape 6

Q: When you told them that you came from America and asked them what plans they had, what did they tell you?

A: Do you mean in the beginning?

Q: Yes, at that time, you went to Norbulinga, right?

A: Yes, I disguised as a monk and went to Norbulinga. I went twice to the work hostel of Phala [in Norbulinga].

Q: At that time, what did you tell them?

A: I told them "The Americans said "What kinds of plans do you have. You should submit the information and the plans to us and what are you going to do? What do you have to tell us. You should tell us whether you are going to oppose secretly or you are going to use force and oppose".

Q: Did you actually ask these questions?

A: Yes, then Phala said "We will discuss about this. I can't make the decision by myself". Later, the aristocrats, the kudra did something up and down and hither and thither. Because the kudra themselves were unreliable, they were unable to make any plans. They didn't tell any thing to the Americans that they are going to do this and that. And they didn't request the Americans for the support. Therefore, the Americans were very agitated and said that the kudra are incapable of doing any thing. When I arrived at India at the first time, the Americans didn't trust the Kudra much.

Actually, the Tibetan government should at first make a plan whether you are going to oppose the Chinese or not. The cabinet ministers or some of the officials of the Tibetan government should think about that and they should have done something and make a plan even if they couldn't make all the plans. But, they were unable to do any thing. And they didn't send a letter with a single word saying that they are going to do this and that. Probably, the Americans didn't have a single letter from the Tibetan government.

Q: In the beginning, you met Phala and later you talked with Gombo Tashi, right?

A: Yes.

Q: What did he say when you told him that the Tibetan government didn't have any plan?

A: Later, Andrug Tshang was in a desperate situation [Tib.'u thug] because the Tibetan government didn't have anything to do. So he went out of Lhasa leading the Khambas of the Chushigandru. At that time, all of us went out of Lhasa. In the beginning, we were supposed to do it together, but when the Tibetan government was unable to do anything and make any plan and they couldn't help [the Khambas]. The Tibetan government had never given us a single bullet and a gun. The Tibetan government had guns and bullets. Gyapön Kalsang Dramdul [Tib. brga dpon skal bzang dgra 'dul] leader of a unit of hundred and the First Battalion Leader [Tib. ru dpon dang po] lend a machine gun to Gombo Tashi. They told him to return it as soon as possible. Otherwise, if the Chinese and the Tibetan government noticed about that, we will have a very hard time. So they had to return it.

Q: After that, you went to Kolcutta and talked with Prike, what did he say at that time?

A: Who was that?

Q: You went to Kolcutta to ask questions to the American CIA agent, right?

A: Yes.

Q: What did the American agent say? Did he feel kind of disappointed [Tib. blo pham] because the Tibetan government didn't make any move?

A: Yes, at that time, I told him, "The Tibetan government is not making any move. I had delivered all of your messages to Phala Drönyerchemmo, but, they didn't tell me anything and they are not doing the work. So we didn't have anything to do. Two of us were just like messengers and if we make a plan, they will not do that. Therefore, Gombo Tashi and all of us went outside. If we didn't go out, one day the Chinese will strangle us. So we departed [from Lhasa]. Will you support us weapons or not?" At that time, there wasn't anything to tell the Tibetan government. It was like dismissed.

Q: At that time, with whom did Gyalo Thondup stand? Was he standing on your side?

A: Yes, at that time, he was 100% standing on our side. But, he also didn't have anything to do. He became famous by working with us. Otherwise, he won't be famous because the kudra were not working and he was unable to go to Tibet and he didn't have soldiers to take with him. He was just staying in India and became famous because of the Khambas and working with the Americans.

Q: After you were air dropped in Tibet, how soon did you meet Phala?

A: I met him after 3 months. At that time, the Americans told us not to go to Lhasa before 3 months because if they hear the drone of the plane and knew that you were air dropped, they will search for you in Lhasa.

Q: In the beginning, Phala told you that they have to discuss and he could not give the answer. After that, when did he give you the answer from the Tibetan government?

A: They didn't give any answer at all. So we were pursuing them for the answer and we told them that the Chinese are doing this and that. Actually, regarding what the Chinese were doing, they [Tibetan government] knew more than us. But, they couldn't do anything. If they would make a plan, the kudra were afraid of the Kudra. So they were just defending [Tib. srung skyob] themselves saying that if we don't careful, it would be dangerous for the Dalai Lama. They didn't make any plan for doing this and that.

Q: Do you think that the Dalai Lama knew about your meeting with Phala?

A: The Dalai Lama told me that he knew about that.

Q: Was that in 1958?

A: Yes, when the Dalai Lama came to the border in 1958, he told me "I knew that two of you had come to Tibet. But, I was not able to meet two of you directly. So don't feel disappointed. I knew all about the matter through Phala". When we were in Lhasa, two of us requested for the audience with the Dalai Lama. If we are allowed to report the matters, we will make the report. If we are not allowed, we will just go for the audience with him. In the beginning, they said that they will try to grant the audience. But, later, they said "We can't grant the audience because there are Chinese spies in the front of the Dalai Lama. So it is difficult". They didn't grant the audience.

Later, when the Dalai Lama came to the border, he told two of us "I knew that two of you had arrived at Tibet, but I was unable to meet two of you. So do not feel disappointed about that".

Q: At that time, Gombo Tashi was in Drigu and what kind of plans he had regarding the fighting?

A: He was in a desperate situation because at that time, they were arresting many Chinese who were from Xi Nying [zi ling]. It was said that after the Chinese were arrested, then the Amdos will be expelled from Lhasa. They told the traders from Xi Nying that they are not allowed to stay in Lhasa. They have to go back.

And some of the Amdos were also told that they are not allowed to stay in Lhasa. They have to go back home. After that, the Khambas also would be told to go back home. If they arrested the better persons among the Khambas, among the Amdos and in the Tibetan government, then it is finished. At that time, all of us had the experience how the Chinese did in Kham. So we were saying that we could no longer stay [in Lhasa].

One day, we decided to go and asked the oracle of the Panglung Gyalchen [Tib. spang lung rgyal chen], Dorje Shungdan [Tib. rdo

rje shugs ldan] to go into trance. Gombo Tashi used to worship that deity a lot. When we asked for the prophecy, the deity gave the following prophecy "Do not stay. Go to the south. Do not stay in Lhasa after the 28th of the 4th Tibetan month. There will be a trouble then. So you should go outside". So we left Lhasa on the 16th.

Q: Before you left, did you meet Phala?

A: Later, Phala was afraid and he didn't let us come to see him in Norbulinga. The monk official Commander-in Chief, Magji Kalsang Ngawang [Tib. dmag spyi skal bzang ngag dbang] was a very close friend of Phala.

Q: Was he the Commander?

A: Yes, he was the real Commander.

[TN note: actually, at that time, Kalsang Ngawang was not the Commander-in-Chief. He was a Khanjung and he was a member of the Ex-Commander-in Chief, Magji Khanjung Kaltshul La's [Tib. skal tshul lags] monks household. He was from Kham, so he was called by the nickname Khanjung Arog. He died in the Sangyib prison in Lhasa]

So, we met Kalsang Ngawang and he delivered the messages to Phala. He lives near the Lingkor [Tib. gling skor] Road in Lhasa and it is easy to meet him. We didn't need to disguise as a monk. We can just go there wearing Khamba chupa and meet him. So Gombo Tashi, Lotse and I went to meet Kalsang Ngawang.

At that time, Gombo Tashi left the following message with Kalsang Ngawang "Now, I had finished telling you all the things that I have to tell you. There is only one possibility for the snow land Tibet. One day, all the kudra of the Tibetan government, the heads [Tib. mi drag] of the three provinces; Kham and Amdo and all the Lamas and monks will be shut in the Chinese jail with their red and yellow robes and chupas. At that moment, we don't know what would happen to the Dalai Lama. So we can not take the risk of this danger, but the Tibetan government is not making any move. We can no longer stay here. So we are leaving. Please report this to the Dalai Lama. This is my last word. I was unable to serve you. Now, I am sorry to tell you that I am leaving".

Q: Did Gombo Tashi say that?

A: Yes, he told him to report it to the Dalai Lama through Phala. Then he told him "If you need to blame somebody when you talk with the Chinese and if it would be beneficial for the Chinese, then you can blame me and say that all the things were done by Gombo Tashi". I can't go to the Chinese jail holding my hands like this. Instead of that, I am going to sacrifice my life and leave. As for two of them, at first they were sent to contact the Tibetan government and secondly, they were sent to contact me. If two of them would be beneficial for contacting you, you can keep them. If it is not beneficial and if you can't do anything, they would have to go with me. You can think about it". At the end, he said "Please report the Dalai Lama that we are requesting him not to be offended".

At that moment, Kalsang Ngawang said "Please take two of them together. If they stay here, nobody will be able to contact them and it is useless. Two of you just go with Gombo Tashi". This is the last word.

Q: Did he say that right away?

A: Yes, he didn't say that he will ask somebody. He just said it directly. Before that, they knew that Gombo Tashi is preparing to go. Then we left for Lhoka.

Q: Did they know clearly that you guys were going to make war?

A: Of course, they knew that. We told them that we are going to fight and rebel against the Chinese.

Q: At that time, the Tibetan government didn't make any move. But, did you think that Phala might have the plan to fight. What were Gombo Tashio and two you thinking about this?

A: No, Phala didn't have the courage to fight. Kalsang Ngawang was a little bit better. He used to carry a Canadian Pistol in his pouch when he would go out. At that time, from the Chinese point of view, they were regarding him as a black man or a bad man. I heard that there were several tsidrung who were quite good. They were not obeying the Chinese and they were trying to rebel against the Chinese with Kalsang Ngawang and those people. So the Chinese were spiteful [Tib. gnag po] to those tsidrung and they were trying their best to treat them badly and demote them or fire them from their positions.

Q: Then all of you left Lhasa, right?

A: Yes, we left Lhasa on the 16th.

Q: Then you went to Kalung Estate, right?

A: Yes.

Q: Who's estate was that?

A: Probably, that estate was Surkhang's. The estate and the area was belonged to Surkhang. We stayed in a big household who was one of the main servants of Surkhang. Some of us stayed in the estate. Some of them stayed in the house of late Wangdü Dorje [Tib. dbang 'dus rdo rje] who later became a kalön in India. Their house was located at the place called Lhodrag Nawoche [Tib. lho brag sna ? bo che].

Q: Did Gombo Tashi and Surkhang have any relations?

A: No, they didn't. We just went there like bullying them. At that time, the misers were saying that they didn't have rooms for rent, but we just rode horse and carried guns and went in. [laughter]

Q: At that time, how many people were there with you?

A: There were 70 riders.

Q: Was this the first batch?

A: Yes, Kharchen Gyalthang Chandzö [Tib. mkhar chen rgyal thang phyag mdzod] had 16 riders. We had 4 eating communes and we had about 20 riders and Andrug Tshang had 36 riders.

Q: Did you have pack animals?

A: Yes, we had mules. Andru Tshang had a lot of ammunition and guns. We loaded mules with all of these things.

Q: How many mules did you have?

A: Probably, we had about 40 mules.

Q: Then, you went to Driguthang, right?

A: Then, we stayed in Lhodrag and the soldiers of the Chushigandru went to Driguthang. Kalung Estate was near to Drigu. It was about one day journey and we have to cross a mountain pass. Lhodrag was a agricultural place and Driguthang was a plain and nomad's area.

At that time, the soldiers were told not to come down. If the riders would go through the fields in summer, the horses might damage the crops. So we told the soldiers not to come down and we built the regiment in Drigu and send the people for recruiting the soldiers. So, on the 16th of June on which we held the military celebration [Tib. dmag don rten 'brel] as the Chushigandru's Day [Tib. dus chen], we established the regiment of Chushigandru. And we did all the things that the Khambas used to do for promising to revolt against the Chinese.

Q: Was that on the 16th?

A: Yes, that was on the 16th of June. After that, Gombo Tashi lead the soldiers and went to the north.

Q: Gombo Tashi went to the north to get the guns, right?

A: At that time, there were 300 rifles in Gandan Chönkhor [Tib. dga' ldan chos 'khor] Monastery that belonged to the Tibetan government. The Tibetan government had left some weapons in that monastery for what ever kind of purpose it might be.

Before that, when Gombo Tashi went to the north for trading, he knew about that. So at that time, probably, he secretly took 800 soldiers. He said that he was going to take 1000, but probably he didn't take that much. At that time, a Chinese spy who had intruded among the Chushigandru revealed the secret and informed the Chinese that they are going to the north. So, the Chinese ambushed the Khambas in the place called Dokhar Sumdo [Tib. mdo? mkhar gsum mdo] and many of our people were killed on the first day. 12 of them were from Litang, and 18 were from Chantreng [Tib. cha phreng]. Altogether about 30 of our people were killed and they probably killed many Chinese soldiers.

Q: Before this battle took place and before Gombo Tashi went to get the guns, did he tell you to send a telegram to America for the support of weapon?

A: Yes, we sent telegram to America and told them that now we had built the regiment and we are making war against the Chinese and we requested them to send weapons. But, they didn't send any weapons. The American told us they we have to send them the plans for making war and they want me to come carrying the plan. That was the reason for me to go to Kolcutta.

Q: When you left Drigu, did Andru Tshang depart from Drigu?

A: No, at that time, he was in Drigu. At that time, two of us made the plan. Gombo Tashi was not to be blamed because he didn't get any of military training. He was just a trader. He was telling us that they want many things and some big things. I told him that you should not say that. Later, 5-6 people in the Chushigandru made their plan. They didn't agree to the plan that we made. So I let them make the plan.

Q: What do you mean big things?

A: They said that they want Hawazara cannon. But, actually, Hawazara need a truck for carrying it and there is one load for one shell used in the Hawazar. So how can we carry those things. When I told them we can't use those things, they said that if we didn't have that kind of weapons we can't cope with the Chinese. When I told them that our soldiers were infantries, the weapons should be able to be carried by men or load on the horses. They were insisting that they want some big things. Then I told them "You guys make your own plan and two of us will make a plan and we can submit it together and they will decide what to do".

I handed over the plan made by Gombo Tashi to Gyalo Thondup. He was laughing and he made some changes on the plan. At that time, Gyalo Thondup called Tubten Nyinje [Tib. thub bstan nyin byed] who was called Kungo Palchö [Tib. dpal cos]. He might have been the Palchö Khenpo [Tib. dpal chos mkhan po] in Gyantse and told him to make the changes in the plan because his Tibetan was good. But, still the plan was not made well. The plan we made was made according to the training that we got.

Q: Did you show your plan to Gyalo Thondup?

A: Yes, but he said you don't need to show me this because you are going there and you can submit it to them. It would not be okay if I don't make some changes in the Gombo Tashi's plan and he had cut off the Hawazara in the plan. How could they bring the Hawazara on the mountain and in the water if you don't have a truck and a good motorable road. In the past, the Tibetan government had a few British cannons that were driven on wheels. They might have seen those stuffs. So they just made the plan.

Then we came to Kolcutta. In my plan, I requested them for an anti-aircraft machine gun called 50 Columbar. They said they will not give that for the time being. At that time, the Americans didn't have those guns which were sold outside. Probably, at that time, they only had the ones that they had made for their own use. They said, "You have to cut off that machine gun from the plan. Otherwise, we will support whatever weapons you had requested". The American took the plan and went to America and he made me to wait for a week in Kolcutta. He didn't make the decision and he went back.

Q: Did he go back to America?

A: I didn't know whether we went to America or not. Perhaps he went to the CIA Headquarter in Okinawa or some where. After that, he came back and told us "The plan made by two of you were alright and you got the sanction for training 500 people. They can be trained gradually in batches of 15-20 people. And we will give you the weapons that two of you wanted. Do not make war with the Chinese for two years until the guerrilla would become strong enough. You just keep on the guerrilla warfare. Otherwise, you will not be able to cope with the Chinese. You should deceive the Chinese by handing over your old weapons saying that you are going to surrender gradually. Do not make the Chinese feel angry. You should hide the new weapons. Some of the Khambas had a gun, but they had only 10-15 bullets. How could we get the bullets, because we had to pay 5 dayan for a single bullet. We can't get the bullets, because we didn't have the bullet factory and the market for that. The Khambas got those weapons from China when the Guomindang sold them.

Q: Did they tell you not to make war with the Chinese for two years and during that time, you should deceive the Chinese and make your organization strong, right?

A: Yes, and they said that they will train 500 people within two years. That was because the weapons should be given with the trained people. While two of us were in Tibet, they sent 15 people. At that time, they had reached in Kalimpong. At that time, the Americans came to Kalimpong and they were teaching something to them through Gyalo Thondup.

Q: Was that when you were in Drigu?

A: No, that was before we went to Drigu and we were in Lhasa. At that time, there were 27 of us and among them they sent 15 people again.

Q: Were they in Kalimpong?

A: Yes, when I came to Kalimpong, they were also in Kalimpong. At that time, I told the Americans that they should take them as soon as possible and give them the training. Otherwise, there are only two of us which is not enough for the work that should be done.

Q: Did you sent a telegram?

A: No, that was the time, when I came to Kolcutta. Before that, we sent telegrams and told them to take them for training, but they didn't do that. When I came to Kolcutta and the decision for the training was made, they said they will take them right away and they took them for training. When the Dalai Lama escaped to India, their training was finished.

Q: Did they send them to America directly?

A: Yes, they were sent to Colorado.

Q: This was the second group, right?

A: Yes, among them, there was a nephew of Andru Tshang called Ngawang Phulchung [Tib. ngag dbang phul bying] and Drolma. Altogether they took about 10-11 people. They took 15 people, but 4-5 of them were said to have TB and they were sent back from Okinawa.

Later, they were air dropped in Namtshokha [Tib. gnam mtsho kha] in northern Tibet. They were unable to make the guerrilla warfare. So they returned back to Mustang Regiment and then they came back to Darjeeling. After that, they were brought to Okinawa and America and they were air dropped in Damshung [Tib.'dam gzhung].

Q: They were already trained, right?

A: Yes.

Q: Why did they go to Okinawa?

A: Probably, they gave them some more training there. At that time, they couldn't stay in Pakistan because the base was not that good.

Q: When you went to Kolcutta, you didn't have the wireless with you, right?

A: No, I didn't have that.

Q: After you finished your work and went back to Tibet, did you have a new wireless to take with you?

A: No, I didn't take the wireless. My partner had kept it in Tibet.

Q: Where was he at that time?

A: He was in Lhoka.

Q: At that time, you went through Bhutan, right?

A: I went to Sharsingma in Yadong and got into a fight with the Chinese and I ran away again to Bhutan.

Q: Did you go to Lhoka through Bhutan?

A: When you crossed Bhutan you will reach Lhoka.

A: Yes, we could reach Lhoka directly through Bhutan

Q: After that, did you send a telegram telling them to send new guns?

A: While I was in Kolcutta, my partner sent a telegram saying that his group is short of guns and if the Chinese would come we didn't have much ammunition. Please send guns and ammunitions. Gombo Tashi went to the north. I heard from the American in Kolcutta about that. I told the American, this is true. He really needs weapons and there isn't any security safety [Tib. srung skyob] for the communication group. And the weapons that we had were taken to the north. So please air drop weapons". After that, they air dropped weapons for one company before I reached Bhutan.

Q: Did you know where they had dropped the weapons?

A: My partner knows about that and he gave the signals to the Americans. He himself told the American to drop the weapons. When I was going to the boarder of Bhutan, a plane had dropped the weapons.

Q: What did they drop in one drop? Were there machine guns?

A: Yes, there were. They dropped two 57 millimeters cannons.

Q: What kind of cannon was this?

A: This was the shoulder held artillery. We Tibetan called it Tregyog [Tib. phrag sgyogs]. And there was a 75 millimeters cannon. But, we can't load it on the mule's back. If a person is not very strong, he can't carry it on the back. If we put it on the shoulder and fire it, the shoulder will get hurt very badly. Even those very strong American soldiers can't fire that cannon. They could carry it on their backs, but they were extremely scared and they didn't dare to fire it. They gave us the training for firing that cannon, but they didn't drop that. And there were two 202Y machine guns. That was a Chinese made machine gun. That kind of machine gun was originally made in Germany and the American also made it. All of the American bullets were M1 and this ammunition was a different one. It was 202Y.

Q: Did they drop M1?

A: They dropped the M1 later on. If they had dropped it earlier, the Chinese will be suspicious because M1 was the real Army rifle [Tib. dmag mda].

Q: What kind of rifles did they drop?

A: They dropped the 303 English Carbine. The shape of rifle was not same and it was called Tashi Kharing [Tib. bkra shis kha ring], but the ammunition was same.

Q: The second airdrop was in 1959, right?

A: Yes, it was just after the Tibetan New Year and just before the revolt in 1959. That was dropped on the 15th of First Tibetan month. That was the second drop. At that time, I was in Tibet and I went to get the weapons. This was also an amount of weapons dropped for one company.

Q: How many people were there in a company?

A: There were 150 people. It was regarded that two cannons need 6 people and 4 people for 2 machine guns. And there were 20 Stenguns or sub-machine guns. The rest of the rifles were 303 English Carbine.

Q: When you went back to the Chushigandru, were the people of the Chushigandru attentive of the Americans telling you "Don't make war for two years against the Chinese".?

A: I told them that we should be tactful and don't make war, but they were not listening to it at all. At that time, the Khambas were saying "We came out to fight. So we are going to fight and kill as much we can". They were not to be blamed because they didn't have the mental understanding standard and they didn't know the strength of the Chinese.

When it was told that we have to comply [with the rules], the Khambas were wearing white shirts and riding the horses at night with the bells on the horses making the sound "salang salang" [laughter] When I told them, "You shouldn't go like this". They said "We have to go like this. If we are going to die any way, we will die even if we sit on the lap of the Buddha statue in Jokhang".

When I told them that we have to comply [with the rules] and go carefully, even if 10 people listened to me, 20 people will not listen to me. At that time, two of us had a group of 28 people. We trained them and when we depart at night, we put that rubber stuff on the hooves of the horses to get rid of the sound and we were going to the distances that people would not know that we were going. When we go in daytime, we were also complying with the rules.

Q: Who was the leader of the Khambas then, Andru Tshang was not their, right?

A: Each of the groups had their own leaders. There were ABCD and there were 29 divisions. There were the divisions of Litang, Markham [Tib. smar khams] Dargye Gonpa [Tib. dar rgyas dgon pa] Chanteng [Tib. cha phreng]. Each division had their two or three leaders appointed in Drigu like the captains and two leaders of a unit of hundred [Tib. brgya dpon] two squad leaders.

Q: Who were the leaders above those groups?

A: That was the Headquarter [Tib. dmag spyi khang] in Lhoka. At that time, the main leader was Gombo Tashi who was then at north and there were many other leaders of Chushigandru like Jangtsha Chöndze [Tib. 'jang tsha], Sandu Lonyendrag [Tib. sa 'du blo snyan grags], Jagö Namgyal Dorje [Tib. bya rgod nam rhyal rdo rje] and Bapa Chandzö Tashi ['ba' pa phyag mdzod bkra shis] and many others.

Q: Was there Jamatshang?

A: Yes.

Q: Kyamgon Chandzö [Tib. skyabs mgon phyag mdzod] was also there, right?

A: Yes, there was one person from each area in the Headquarter and there were also leaders going with the soldiers.

Q: In the beginning, all of you were in Drigu, right?

A: Yes.

Q: But, I was confused when I heard that all of a sudden some people were in Lhagyari, how did this happen?

A: The regiment was set up in Drigu in summer because we could graze horses and mules on the mountain, but in winter the horses and the mules didn't have grass to eat on the northern pastures. So we have to go to the farmer's area and feed them with hay. Therefore, the regiment moved to Lhagyari. After that, the regiment moved to Yarlung Phodrang [Tib. yar lung pho brang]. The reason for moving to Yarlung was because the Chushigandru made the war in Tsethang. So it was said that Yarlung was near to Tsetang. So it would be convenient to give the orders and send people. And it was also said that it would be easier for us when Dalai Lama would come if we move to Yarlung.

Q: How many soldiers were there when you moved to Lhagyari?

A: I didn't know the exact number. But, when we count the soldiers roughly after Dalai Lama left, there were about 5000 soldiers. At that time, Gombo Tashi came back from the north with about 2000 soldiers.

Q: In one time, did Jagö Namgyal Dorje stay separately from the main regiment with a group of soldiers?

A: Two of us were staying separately. We were not staying in the main regiment.

Q: I mean Namgyal Dorje?

A: He was staying in the main regiment. At that time, Jagö Namgyal Dore, Jangtsha Chöndze and Lonyendrag were said to be going to India to make connections with the Guomindang and America for getting the weapon support quickly. They held the meeting with Namseling and three of them were sent. This was an evil plan [Tib. jus ngan] made by Namseling. It didn't work out well. Three of them were the better persons in the Chushigandru during the absence of Gombo Tashi. He didn't let them stay there. He was supposed to do something by himself, but this also didn't work out and Chushigandru and Namseling had a quarrel.

Q: Did Namseling know what work you were doing?

A: He knew that two of us were there because Gombo Tashi and Namseling were very friendly in the past.

Q: If he knew that, why did he send three people for getting the weapon support from Taiwan?

A: At that time, I sent a letter to the regiment and we received a letter from the regiment asking me whether three of them should go for the weapon support. I said, "It is useless to go. Don't go. Stay in the regiment firmly until Gombo Tashi comes back. If there would be somebody to talk about the weapon support, Gyalo Thondup and the Jenkhentsisum and many people from the three provinces of Tibet are in Kalimpong, they will talk to that person. Two of us are continuously making the contact from here. You had seen the airdrop of weapon support that had already arrived. You should think about this, if they are not going to support us, they would not airdrop weapons. At that time, the weapons were divided. So you should think about whether you should go or not". But, they didn't listen to me and they went to Kalimpong. After they got to Kalimpong, we also ran away down there. It didn't make any difference for going to Kalimpong at that time. What is there the Taiwan should do?

Q: At this times, what was their thinking? Did they think the weapon was not coming quickly?

A: Yes, they were saying the weapons are not coming quickly and there weren't many weapons. And they need many weapons very quickly. At that time, the Khambas were thinking that they need weapons to fight with the Chinese right away. The Americans were thinking that if they do that, the Chinese will suppress our main force because we just had several thousands soldiers. In Kham Litang we had 40,000 soldiers consisted with all the Lamas and monks. At that time, we recruited the people from the age 18-60 and we said that nobody is allowed stay home. The Tibetans didn't have any military organization and training. Each person was riding a horse and all of them were going together, it seemed like the whole area couldn't hold so many people. Later, we had to tell the elderly and kids to go back home because it seemed that the regiment didn't know how to move forward. Each person was riding a horse and there were also pack animals. When we arrived at a place, we couldn't get food and drink.

According to the American plan and the training, the people should remain in small groups and sometimes, they can leave the weapons home and go to do farming if it is necessary. If they have to fight at night, go to fight and come back home and pretend that they didn't fight. That was the guerrilla training.

But, the Khambas were not doing that at all. They were just riding a horse, carrying a gun and yelling [ki]. [laughter] This would be hard to work out something, right? At that time, it was also very hard to give the training. Even our partners who were like related to us were not listening to what we told them. At that time, I took over all the bells hanged on the horse neck and I broke them and threw them into the water. When we were going together, they didn't hang the bells. But on the next day when they were going some where they hanged the bells on their horse neck. The Tibetans were kind of grossed in doing that.

Q: I am kind of confused when I heard that Namseling told the leaders of the Chushigandru that they shouldn't stay in the south and they should go to the north.

A: This was true?

Q: Where did he mean in the north? What was his plan?

A: At that time, some people were saying that he came as a spy for the communist. I don't think so. Some people were saying that Namseling was planing to get together the discharged soldiers of the third and the fourth regiments [Tib. ga dang nga dang] of the Tibetan government who were then in the country side in Lhoka and he wanted the Khambas to fight in the north.

Q: Did he mean Jangthang [Tib. byang thang] the northern area?

A: Yes, the north side beyond Lhasa was called the north. And he was saying that the militia would stay in the south. He sent a letter about this to two of us. I thought that was right. He wrote in his letter "Two of us should come and stay with me. Because, Gombo Tashi and I were very close friends like one person and we were making the plans together". Then I sent the answering letter

Q: When was that? Was that before you went to Kolcutta?

A: At that time, we were staying in Lhoka. Namseling, Samchog la [Tib. bsam mchog lags] and Jorgye [Tib. 'byor rgyas], the governor of Lhoka [Tib. lho spyi] and the representatives of the three great monasteries [Tib. se 'bras dga' gsum] came to Lhoka. We, the Chushigandru still have the letter. It was written in the letter "You should hand over all the weapons to us. If you don't hand over the weapons to the Chinese now, one day, the Central Government and Tibetan government might have to make you suffer. If you hand over the weapons and engage in business as before, the Tibetan government will guarantee that nobody would tell you any thing. If you don't obey the order, in the future when the Central Government and the Tibetan government have to take the action, you would have to feel regret".

At that time, Namseling took the letter and three of them came to talk with the Khambas. They told us to hand over the weapons and do not rebel in Lhoka and stay friendly with the Chinese. That was an edict sent from the Kashag and the Chushigandru still have the edict. They sent about 2-3 edicts.

At that time, Chushigandru told them "We are here because we could not hand over the weapons. If you want us to hand over the weapons, we can't do that. When the leaders quarrelled [Tib. rnyog dra bshad] about that, Namseling and Samchog La were unable to go back and just stayed in Lhoka. The representatives of the three great monasteries and some of the kudra went back to Lhasa. Namseling and some other kudra didn't dare to go back thinking that the Chinese will not treat them nicely. At that time, the Chinese didn't like Namseling. After that, they made some plans for doing this and that and told their plans to Chushigandru and Chushigandru didn't agree to that.

When two of us received the letter [from the Kashag], we had the order from America saying "Leave alone Namseling, you should not stay with Gombo Tashi also. Nobody should know where you are". There is nothing to do if two of us would stay with them. We can just tell Gombo Tashi what we should tell him. If we stay with the regiment and if we were killed when the Chinese would attack the main regiment, the communication line will be cut off.

Therefore, two of us were wearing poor clothes of an ordinary soldier as a secret agent and going separately. According to the system of the secret organization, two of us didn't need to stay in the main regiment because we were working separately. Our partners were wearing good clothes, so if some one would attack, they would attack them first. We had send spies every where to watch what the Chinese were doing and whether they were coming or not and what kind of weapons the Chinese have and where is the radar. And we have to tell the Americans that after how many hours the plane could return after the airdrop and whether the Chinese plane could chase it or not. What would be the distance between the American air dropper plane and the Chinese plane. For example, at that time, there was an airport in Damshung and they had the radar, but we didn't know how powerful the radar would be. But, I went to take the photos of the shape of the radar and sent the photo to them and the Americans will know the

power of the radar. These were our duties and it was not our duties and stay in the regiment and go back and forth with the soldiers. We also had to go to find the place for the airdrop and we have to calculate how far the wind would blow away the airdrops. There wasn't many places in Tibet where there were no nomads. Hence, we have to tell the nomads not to stay in that place because the soldiers will come here and shoot and the Chinese soldiers will come and made them move out. The nomads were running away. They won't take the risk and stay there. they loaded their yaks and left. Like this, we left the empty space like several kilometers wide. I prepared for the drop zones in three places.